

# Foundation for Regulating Pipelines

## United States and Europe: Two Different Regulatory Worlds

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*(with thanks to Jeff Makholm, NERA Economic Consulting, Boston)*

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# There is now a handy source for the following ideas on regulating pipelines




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Jeff D. Makholtm

## The Political Economy of Pipelines

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# Outline: Three Topics



## 1. How Europe differs from the United States

- The gulf between European and US gas pipelines
- What this means for European and US gas markets

## 2. The institutional foundation for effective pipeline regulation

- Economic governance as a general concept
- Specific regulatory institutions for pipelines

## 3. Consequences of ineffective pipeline regulation in Europe

- Social costs and political consequences



# Part 1: The (Similarities and) Differences



- **How Europe is like, and unlike, the United States**
  - Inland gas transport industry
  - Gas markets
  - What regulators do

# Gas pipelines differ in important ways from electricity transmission



## ■ Similarities

- Both are inland energy transport systems
- Both are highly capital intensive, irreversible and linked to particular suppliers and energy users
  - They are “relationship-specific investments” in the language of transaction cost economics.

## ■ Differences

- Electricity: sub-atomic particles moving at the speed of light
  - Flow paths are unpredictable.
    - Transmission “externalities” (loop flows) are endemic in electricity, but there are none in gas that can’t be handled with operational transparency and commercial/accounting conventions.
- Gas: molecules moving at 50km/h
  - Defining physical-path transport contracts is easy.

# Electricity transmission is a “grid”; Gas pipelines are “point-to-point”




- **Electricity transmission is a “Grid”**
  - The grid is “pooled” energy transport system where users necessarily share costs and regulators oversee planning and tariffs.
  - Physical path contracts are impossible to define with any accuracy or stability
- **Gas transmission is an orderly system of inland transport from place to place—not a “Grid”**
  - The system need not be a pooled, shared-cost system.
  - Pipeline capacity is bounded and its usage is exclusive
  - By separating out contracts for physical paths, its use and expansion can be made competitive.

# Pipelines are pipelines, the whole world over....(1) The US




## Natural Gas Pipeline Network 2000



# Pipelines are pipelines, the whole world over.....(2) Europe



Natural Gas distribution system in Europe including the CIS states



Major flows of gas →

North Sea / Dutch gas fields ●

# Company Structure: EU and US gas pipelines have different histories



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## EUROPE

- **Integrated** with gas distribution
- Transporters of their own gas (until recently)
- Operating and financial data **private (closed)**
- Capacity kept **secret** from shippers
- **Protected** from rivalry
- **Monopoly** transport

## UNITED STATES

- **Separate** from gas distribution
- May not transport their own gas (since the 1990s)
- Operating and financial data **public (open)**
- Capacity licensed by regulator and **well-known**
- **Exposed** to entry
- **Competitive** transport

# Gas Transport: EU and US regulatory agencies perform different roles



## EUROPE

- National authorities coordinate their activities through ERGEG
- National authorities:
  - regulate gas distribution
  - regulate gas transport
- Member States:
  - **cede no regulatory powers** to the European Commission
  - **defend “national champions”**
- Regulators are **not independent** of the National Executive Authority

## UNITED STATES

- State authorities coordinate their activities through NARUC
- State authorities:
  - regulate gas distribution
  - **do not** regulate gas transport
- The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:
  - deals with all gas transport
  - **promotes rivalry in pipeline transport**
- Regulators are **independent** of State Executive authority



# US Gas Transport Market



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- **Pipelines:** Operate and maintain regulated pipeline capacity—no role in the gas commodity market
- **Contract Shippers:** Control licensed pipeline capacity, to use or sell in unregulated markets
- **FERC:** Prime (new) job is protecting the value of shippers' capacity rights and overseeing frictionless pipeline-maintained, on-line trading mechanisms. Secondary (traditional) FERC job is overseeing cost-based pipeline prices.
- **State Regulators:** No direct involvement in interstate pipeline transport.
- **Incumbents and Entrants:** Seek out buyers for additional capacity—to be built and charged at cost-based “incremental” regulated prices.
- **Non-contract shippers:** Buy firm capacity from contract shippers or interruptible capacity from regulated pipeline companies.



# US systems permit competition to build new pipelines




- Contract Capacity offers tradeable, “Coasian” property rights, so a market price emerges for pipeline capacity
- Contract Capacity matches pipeline capacity, physically and in cost structure, so the market price shows the value of real investments between specific places
- Anyone can build a new pipeline and connect it to existing pipelines via “taps” = “Open Access to Economies of Scale”

**A constraint makes capacity from B to C  
valuable in the market**

Point-to-Point  
Contracts



Point-to-Point  
Capacity



**Competing investor adds capacity  
 (“loop”) at least cost**

# What makes competitive pipeline transport work?



## For Efficient Investment

**Open seasons**

Enables cooperation by private investors to exploit economies of scale

**Obligation to provide taps**

Avoids inefficient duplication of capacity  
Preserves competition in expanding pipelines

## For Efficient Use

**Point-to-point charging in long-term contracts**

Aligns the service offering with the physical capacity and with incremental costs

**“Straight fixed-variable” charging structure**

Promotes efficient utilisation by capacity holders:  
Variable usage charges = Variable costs

## For Efficient Access



**Unbundling**

Allows a market price for capacity to emerge  
Unbundling from distribution prevents foreclosure

**Capacity Trading:  
Standard terms and trading platforms**

Traders are familiar with capacity products on all long-distance gas pipelines  
Market access to capacity is cheap and quick

# Entry-exit tariffs reduce gas trading and hide the location of pipeline congestion



Uncongested Capacity   
 Congested Capacity

Each arrow represents 100 units of capacity, e.g. 100 mcm/hour

# Part 2: Why the Differences?

## The institutional foundations for effective pipeline regulation



**Pipelines are pipelines,  
the whole world over....**

**DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONS**  
**EXPLAIN DIFFERING OUTCOMES!**

- Role of private capital
- Political boundaries
- Constitutional protections of property
- Regulatory institutions

# Pipeline Institutions Specific To The US




- **Source of Capital**
  - Private in the US since the 19<sup>th</sup> century
- **Vertical Integration with Distribution**
  - Prohibited in the US since 1935
- **Accounting**
  - No “commercial secrets” since 1912—total transparency
- **Strong Federal Jurisdiction**
  - Commerce Clause of US Constitution of 1787
- **Pipelines Pushed Out of Gas Commodity Business**
  - “Divorcement” begun in 1992, finalized in 2000

# Canada and the US both have robust regulatory institutions



- Regulatory institutions in Canada and U.S. have evolved into similar, stable structures:



# US regulatory institutions have evolved to a position of stability



- Total transparency in capacity and finances for regulated pipeline capacity
- Operational limits, balancing, penalties all based on empirical engineering and cost studies
- Highly competitive trade in access to regulated capacity at unregulated prices
- No outstanding economic controversy

**The US system is in market and regulatory equilibrium, with no pressure to change the rules (not so for the EU)**



# In Europe, gas pipeline regulation lacks long-term stability



- Split jurisdiction:
  - strong national regulatory authorities;
  - weak EU regulator
- Lack of transparency on accounting and operational information
- No constitutional definition of regulated property
- Widespread and weakly-regulated vertical integration controlled by national regulators
- Entry-Exit tariff rules promote integration of pipelines (i.e. monopoly central planning), not competition between pipelines.

**European gas pipeline regulation is unstable as it lacks the institutions underpinning success in North America**



# How would US or Canadian regulatory staffs view Europe's national regulators?



- They would **never understand** why European regulators have not imposed strict accounting legislation.
- They would **search in vain** for solid regulatory book capital values.
- They would **not tolerate secrecy** by the regulated company.
- They would be **unused to any sort of direct pressure** from government Executive/Legislative authorities.
- With such a **powerful FERC**, they would wonder **why DG Tren is so lacking** in authority.
- They would look around and see too many **economists**, and not enough **lawyers, accountants and engineers** to operate transparent processes.
- They would look at **wide area “entry/exit” pricing** and wonder at such an overly-complex way of making pipeline prices, which complicates the role of system operators (compared with simple distance-based, point-to-point tariffs).

# Part 3: Consequences Of Ineffective Pipeline Regulation in Europe




- **Market power in gas**
  - Cost of oil-linked gas contracts
  - Take or pay provisions
  - Prohibition on re-sale in contracts
  - Lack of forward markets
  
- **Market power in pipeline transport**
  - Redundant pipelines (especially to the east)
  - Lack of competitive pressure facing existing pipelines
  - Difficulties over access to existing pipelines

# European consumers are paying double what consumers are paying in the US



## International Gas Prices By Market Area




Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2014.

# Gas prices in the US reflect production costs around 4 US Dollars per MMBTU....



## Henry Hub Natural Gas and WTI Crude January 2005 to February 2014




Source: Bloomberg

# ...whilst European gas prices remain oil-based at around 10 US Dollars per MMBTU



## UK NBP Natural Gas and Forward-Dated Brent Crude January 2005 to February 2014



Source: Bloomberg

# The institutional differences have many real consequences



## EUROPE

- **No gas market** independent of oil markets (except intermittently)
  - **Some spot gas trading**
  - **No forward market** of substance to shift risk of gas price changes
- **No liquid market for inland gas transport capacity**
  - Access is provided on **tariffs**
  - Permits **collusion** and **politicisation** of gas supply
- **Worried about Russia**

## UNITED STATES

- Gas market has long been **independent of oil prices and competitive**
  - **Universal spot trading**
  - **Large forward market** (many times the size of Europe's)
- **Competitive market for inland gas transport capacity**
  - **Low market prices** for access
  - **Politics** not a part of gas supply
- **Not worried about Canada!**



# Gas Transport Markets In Europe: Prospects?



- **In the “Third Package” of EU gas pipeline regulations, gas transport is still treated like electricity transmission**
  - Physical attributes of power grids and gas transport systems are not alike
  - Grids cannot sell physical point-to-point capacity rights;
  - Pipelines can easily sell point-to-point capacity, but the Third Package (Regulation 715.09 art. 13) prohibits point-to-point tariffs.
- **Current prospects for competition are dim:**
  - No effective pressure groups acting for consumers to pursue rivalry in transport (especially no powerful lobby of strictly regulated distribution companies)
  - Legislative packages bend to narrow interests of incumbents
  - ERGEG moving toward more virtual hubs, not more realistic/transparent inland transport
- **Political influence lies with incumbent pipelines and energy traders**

# Gas Commodity Markets In Europe: Prospects?



- **Except for small and isolated markets (like the UK), gas commodity competition depends on competitive inland transport.**
  - NYMEX Henry Hub in the US arose with real unbundling and competition in transport
  - Competitive transport **destroyed long-term price and take-or-pay contracts**
- **Prospect for rivalry in pipeline transport in EU is getting smaller**
  - Incumbents bend legislation in their favor
  - Incumbents resist unbundling and transparency
  - National regulators defend interests

# Experience shows markets for both gas and transport can be competitive



- **Pipelines can be limited to competitive, but cost-based transport service if:**
  - gas transport is unbundled from commodity sales; and
  - furthermore, distribution networks are unbundled from trunk pipelines
- **Capacity rights can form a new market if:**
  - Transport is made fully transparent
  - Regulatory accounts dictate the foundation for regulated tariffs
  - EU regulators defend property rights and frictionless markets for trade
  - Entry/exit is disaggregated into physical point-to-point service
  - Pipeline capacity additions are subject to incremental pricing

**Experience shows that gas and transport markets are separable and that both can be competitive**

# Social costs and political consequences of European inaction



- **Lack of Competition in Gas**
  - No effective gas-on-gas competition from different regions
  - Consumer surplus appropriated by gas producers
  - Gas not re-sellable, creating security of supply problems
  
- **Lack of Competition in Transport**
  - Redundant pipelines
  - Shippers unable to compare pipeline capacity to storage and other options
  - No low cost access to spare pipeline capacity
  
- **Political Consequences**
  - Europe exposed to Russian foreign policy

**European affection for central planning is a major obstacle to the creation of institutions promoting competitive, low cost gas**

# Curing pipeline problems in Europe will face obstacles....



## ▪ **Widespread Command and Control (Central Planning)**

- The monopoly central planning role of TSOs reinforces the problems:
  - Complex tariff structures
  - High-level political alliances and protections from rivalry
- More regulation will not promote greater competition in inland transport or in gas markets.
- Exemptions for new infrastructure will gradually replace existing systems?

## ▪ **Lack of Institutions to Promote Competition**

- Accounting for regulatory purposes
- Transparency of capacity
- Resolution of cross-border regulation and transnational sovereignty

**The United States took 100 years to overcome obstacles...  
...we should start now and learn from US experience!**

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